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THE DONATION REGISTRY
Robert D. Cooter*
When Al Gore disclosed his 1997 tax return, he revealed that his
cash contributions to charity were $353 and his income was $197,000.1
Charitable organizations were distressed by the example he set. The
typical person in his tax bracket was giving ten times as much.2 There
was much discussion about the appropriateness of his behavior and he
defended himself in various ways. I drew two conclusions from this
case. First, the social norm with respect to charitable giving is
relatively inchoate, by which I mean nobody really knows how much
you are supposed to give. Second, except for a few famous politicians
like Al Gore, people who fail to meet their charitable obligations do
not suffer criticism or social sanctions. We don't know exactly how
much we ought to give to charity, and we don't have effective
institutions to enforce the obligation. Consequently, we don't give
very much to charity.
To document the problem, consider the data on charitable giving
provided by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").3 Each year the
IRS publishes a table showing charitable contributions by people who
itemize their deductions when filing their income tax returns.
According to this data, most people in the middle classes (say, $50,000
in income per year or more) donate between two and three percent of
their income to charity.4 People in the highest bracket, which is over
ten million dollars in income per year, jump to donating more than
four percent of their income to charity.' People in the low income
brackets who itemize their deductions give a much larger percentage
of their income to charity than wealthier people, but this fact is

* Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. I would like
to thank Blair Dean, Aaron Edlin, Jennifer Ulveling, and Paul Edwards. This lecture
was first delivered at Fordham University Law School's conference entitled "Rawls
and the Law" on November 8, 2003, whose participants provided useful comments.
1. Gores' Charitable Giving Raises Some Eyebrows, Apr. 15, 1998, at
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/O4/15/gore.taxes/.
2. Id.
3. See David Campbell & Michael Parisi, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2000,
Returns with Itemized Deductions, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income tbl.3 (all
numbers are estimated based on samples), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/00indtr.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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misleading.6 In reality we do not have accurate information on
donations by people in the lower income brackets.
The low rate of giving, I believe, is caused by an information
problem with so-called "disjunctive obligations."
A disjunctive
obligation is something that you ought to do, but not at every
opportunity. For example, you have an obligation to give to the
needy, but you don't have an obligation to give to every needy person
whom you encounter. In this respect, disjunctive obligations are
different than, say, universal obligations. To illustrate, subject to
various exceptions, the obligation to tell the truth applies whenever
you speak.
Like universal and statistical laws in science, universal and
disjunctive obligations in ethics differ dramatically with respect to the
information required to detect a violation. With universal obligations,
observing a single act is sufficient to detect a violation. In contrast,
with disjunctive obligations, detecting a violation requires observing
many acts. Indeed, detecting a violation of the obligation to be
charitable usually requires summing all of a person's donations and
comparing it to a person's income. We almost never know the
proportion of income that another person donates to charity. Lacking
information, we cannot discuss concrete cases as required in morality
and law to make an obligation precise. So it is no surprise that our
charitable obligations remain vague and we are unsure about how
much we ought to give to charity. And it's no surprise that we cannot
bring effective social pressure to bear to enforce this obligation.
The problem can be restated in the language of economics.
Decentralized information collection cannot support the evolutionary
development of disjunctive obligations like charity. There is an
inherent failure in the "market for norms." Overcoming this problem
requires a mechanism to centralize information. As I will explain,
private parties can overcome the information problem with help from
the state.
Experimental evidence is relevant to understanding this problem.7
Behavioral economists and social psychologists have done a lot of
6. In the lower income brackets, most people take the standard deduction
instead of itemizing their deductions. So those who do itemize are unusual people,
specifically the small percentage of poor people who donate a large percentage of
their income to charity.
7. Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of FairnessConsiderations
and Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in Barriers to Conflict
Resolution 87 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter,
Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 Nature 137 (2002); Elizabeth Hoffman et al.,
Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary
Psychology, 36 Econ. Inquiry 335 (1998); Matthew Rabin, IncorporatingFairnessinto
Game Theory and Economics, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1281 (1993); Ernst Fehr et al.,
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives, Sept. 5, 2003, at http://www.uni-koeln.de/wisofak/feld/Schmidt.pdf.
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experiments in so-called "trust games." The characteristic of a trust
game is that a player who trusts others takes a risk. By trusting, the
player wins if the other person is altruistic, and loses if the other
person is selfish. To illustrate a typical trust game, the experimenter
gives me a dollar and then says, "You can either keep the dollar or
you can give it to this other person. If you give it to this other person,
I am going to give the other person two more dollars and then the
other person is going to decide how much to give back to you." If the
other person is altruistic, he returns the original dollar and more
besides, whereas a selfish person keeps everything.
One of the characteristic results of trust games is that people are
much more altruistic than the standard economic model of rational
self-interest would predict.8 Indeed, those people who play the game
based on the assumption that everyone else is strictly self-interested,
as economists are inclined to do, get lower payoffs than those who
place some trust in others. This is because people are in fact more
altruistic than the classical economic model assumes, so the classical
economists bring factually incorrect beliefs to the game.
Another conclusion of these experiments is that information makes
an enormous difference as to what people do. If the games are played
under conditions of perfect anonymity, where it is impossible to know
anything about the identity of another player, a much smaller
proportion of players are altruistic than when they have some
information about the identity of the other players. Charities act as if
they understand this fact when they publish long lists of donors
distinguished by the amount of their gift. For example, the back of
the program at the Metropolitan Opera tells exactly how much the
richest New Yorkers donated. However, no one has a way to find out
the sum of their donations across all charities, or the percentage of
their income that they donated. No one publishes the ratio of cash
contributions to adjusted gross income for New York's wealthiest
taxpayers, or for anyone else.
Another kind of evidence about charity comes from religious
groups. The Judeo-Christian tradition recognizes the obligation to
"tithe."9 Some religious organizations have ways to solve the
information problem with respect to this obligation. For example,
8. For a cross-cultural survey confirming this proposition, see Jean Ensminger,
The Co-Evolution of Social Norms and the Market: Evidence from Economic
Experiments and Social Network Analysis in Africa, Jan. 15, 2004 (manuscript cited

with
permission
from
author),
at
http://www2.jura.unihamburg.de/le/Ensminger%20Paper.pdf.
9. Examples of tithing are prominent in the Bible. For example, Abraham
apparently gave ten percent of his wealth to the high priest, Genesis 14:19-20, and
Jacob promised to give ten percent of his earnings to God, Genesis 28:20-22. Aside
from examples, there is no explicit commandment to tithe. Christians, Jews, and
Muslims recognize the obligation to tithe, but the interpretation of tithing varies
across different groups and sects.
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Mormons who want to participate in the special ceremonies of the
church have to receive annual certification from their Bishop, which
requires an interview. One of the questions in the interview is, "Have
you paid your full tithe?" Mormons are also required to make the
"fast offering," which consists of the money that they save from not
eating two meals per month. The tithe provides Mormons with a
definite standard of each person's fair share of charitable donations
and the institutionalized church provides a mechanism of social
enforcement. 10
Although few religious groups are as successful as Mormons in this
respect, religion still tends to exert a positive influence. Social surveys
using interviews indicate that religious people are far more likely to
donate than secular people. According to a probit regression Arthur
C. Brooks did on a large data set, a person who identifies himself as
secular rather than religious is twenty-three percent less likely to have
made a donation in the last year and twenty-six percent less likely to
have "volunteered."1 1
Apparently the tithe and its enforcement by religious institutions
exert continuing influence on charity by the religious population. I
would ideally replicate this success at the civic level. An overlapping
consensus among religious doctrines and ethical philosophies
recognize charity as an obligation.
We should generalize the
obligation of charity to citizens. Every citizen who enjoys wealth
ought to do his or her share to help less fortunate people. The
problem is to make the civic duty of charity precise and enforce it with
social pressure.
I propose proceeding in three steps. First, the organized charities of
the United States should create a donation registry on the Internet
with open access to the information that it contains. 2 At the same
time, the organized charities should insist that politicians disclose their
income and charitable contributions by disclosing their tax returns.
Second, after the registry becomes accepted among politicians, the
organized charities should pressure all public figures to disclose the
ratio of charitable contributions to adjusted gross income on the
donation registry. They would not be expected to reveal their level of
income or their tax returns. By "public figures," I mean people who
are examples for the rest of us, including politicians, administrators,
10. I am grateful to Paul Edwards for this information. For a statement on tithing
among Mormons, see Elder Jeffery R. Holland, Like a Watered Garden (2001), at
http://www.lds.org/conference/talk/display/0,5232,23-1-225-13,00.html. Basic Mormon
teaching on tithing can be found in Gospel Principles 207-10 (1997), at
http://www.lds.org/gospellibrary/materials/gospe/GospelPrin-Chapters/GospelPrin3l
110_37.pdf.
11. Arthur C. Brooks, Religious Faith and Charitable Giving, 121 Pol'y Rev.
Online (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.policyreview.org/oct03/brooks.html.
12. For two possible hosts of the donation registry, see http://www.guidestar.org/
and http://www.independentsector.org/.
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business leaders, entertainers, and sports heroes. At this stage, society
should have a discussion about what a fair share is and who is doing it.
In the long run, however, the big money for charity is in the middle
class, which is numerous. To solve this problem, my third step is for
the Internal Revenue Service to place an optional box on the tax
form. If the box is checked, the IRS automatically transmits to the
donation registry the taxpayer's name and percentage donation (the
ratio of deductible cash contributions to adjusted gross income).
Once the information is in the donation registry, anyone could look at
it. In this way we could start a discussion that would encompass all of
us and bring social pressure on us to be more generous. Note that
such a check box would solve the problem of verifying that public
figures disclose accurate information.
I will enumerate several of the donation registry's advantages
without discussing them. First, it will result in substantially more
Second, it will accomplish more
contributions to charity.
redistribution by less coercive means than taxation. With less
coercion, the donation registry will avoid worsening the effects of high
marginal tax rates on economic growth and employment. Third,
charitable redistribution is almost certainly more efficient than state
redistribution. Greater efficiency comes especially from the watchful
scrutiny of donors, who withhold donations from inefficient charities.13
(This fact suggests another attractive proposal: shifting redistributive
efforts from the state to non-governmental organizations by partially
replacing the charitable deduction with a charitable tax credit.)
Besides these advantages, the donation registry has some
disadvantages that I will mention without discussing. First, the welfare
state makes poor people feel they have a right to redistributive
benefits. Replacing state aid with charity might undermine the
beneficiary's sense of having a right to receive benefits. For reasons I
Second,
can't explain here, I find this argument unpersuasive.
anonymous charity, which cannot produce any advantage for the
donor, is the purest benevolence, so publicizing charity undermines its
purity. I dismiss this objection because, compared to anonymous
donors, public donors benefit society twice-directly through the use
of the money and indirectly by showing that they did their fair share.
13. A related but difficult question is whether a greater percentage of
expenditures by charities go to redistribution, or whether a greater percentage of
government expenditures go to redistribution. The government and charitable
sectors both undertake many forms of expenditure that are not redistributive, or at
least not redistributive to the poor. Much of the federal government's expenditures
are on the military; its direct purpose has to do with the protection of the state and
not redistribution. In addition many of the regulatory activities in the state benefit
the rich and other undeserving groups. In this respect, private charities have a great
advantage. The advantage arises from the fact that people have to pay their taxes,
even when the taxes are redistributed to the rich, but no one donates to charities that
take from the poor and give to the rich.
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The demonstration that they did their fair share challenges the rest of
us to do our share. Third, the donation registry publicizes facts that
many people would prefer to keep private and stimulates social
sanctions such as gossip. In my view, disclosure of violations is
essential to the effectiveness of any social norm, so this objection to
the donation registry applies equally to any state action that triggers
social sanctions. For example, the defendant who loses at trial would
often prefer to keep the outcome quiet in order to avoid gossip and
social sanctions. Judges, however, do not hesitate to publicize the
outcome of trials, and judges often provoke social sanctions by
castigating the wrongdoer at the trial's end.
My proposal for a donation registry suffers from the usual
weaknesses of proposals for innovative social change. In order to
arrive at the best form, such proposals must be tried by degree and
adjusted by experience. In this spirit, variations on the donation
registry should be articulated and considered. While I believe that
charity is a civic duty, and publicizing the level of individual
compliance is appropriate, many people will find my approach too
aggressive and intrusive. For example, Europeans are much less
aggressive than Americans about soliciting or publicizing charitable
giving." In general, charitable giving has a much larger role in the
United States than in other countries.
An alternative mechanism, which I call the "challenge letter," might
achieve similar results without publicity. The Internal Revenue
Service could automatically send a private letter to each taxpayer
comparing his donation to the donations of others.'" The letter might
challenge the taxpayer to commit to meeting the prevailing social
norm.16 The IRS would not disclose the content of the challenge
letters to the public. The challenge letter might be adopted instead of
the donation registry, or the challenge letter might supplement the
donation registry. If used as a supplement, the challenge letter might
be sent to everyone who did not check the box on his or her tax form
and thus did not disclose his or her donation to the registry.
Another variation on the donation registry could be applied to
lawyers. The obligation of law firms and individual lawyers to provide
pro bono services is widely recognized and enforced in the United
States through social pressure, whereas such services are largely
unknown in other parts of the world. Pro bono services by lawyers in
14. My conversations with European legal scholars suggest this.
15. I want to thank Seana Shiffrin for suggesting that the IRS might send a private
letter to each taxpayer to encourage charitable donations.
16. Jerry M. Burger, The Foot-in-the-Door Compliance Procedure: A MultipleProcess Analysis and Review, 3 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 303-25 (1999);
Robert B. Cialdini et al., Preference for Consistency: The Development of a Valid
Measure and the Discovery of SurprisingBehavioralImplications, 69 J. of Personality
& Soc. Psychol. 318-28 (1995).
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the United States effectively substitute for legal aid provided by the
state in other countries. Pro bono services have advantages and
disadvantages relative to state legal aid programs that I will not
discuss here. My point, however, is that a centralized donation
registry could be established for pro bono legal services. The registry
would list the level of pro bono services provided by law firms and
individual lawyers. Public access to the registry would stimulate
discussions to define more clearly the charitable obligations of lawyers
and enforce them.
Pro bono legal work is an example of a non-cash donation often
referred to as "volunteering." Beside cash contributions, the Internal
Revenue Service allows the deduction of some non-cash donations to
charities. The pro-bono registry is thus a non-cash donation registry,
with values recorded in hours donated rather than dollars. We might
call this variant the "volunteer registry." Presumably there are many
other possibilities for volunteer registries. For example, a volunteer
registry might be created for doctors, teachers, therapists, etc.
Another potential problem with my proposals concerns the
definition of "charity." In the United States, a non-profit organization
can satisfy some easily met conditions17 and register as a charity for
tax purposes. Registration as a charity permits contributors to deduct
their donations from their taxable income. Consequently, the term
"charity" in the United States tends to cover a heterogeneous class of
organizations that satisfy the IRS criteria. Some people, however, will
regard some charities as more relevant than others for social support.
People who feel this way might want to make some adjustments in
what counts as a donation for the donation registry. Indeed, people
who disagree about this matter might want to establish separate
registries with somewhat different criteria for what qualifies as a
donation.
A useful distinction in non-profit organizations is between those
that serve cultural or religious purposes, and those that are primarily
concerned with redistributing income and helping the poor.
Economists sometimes use the term "merit goods" to describe goods
like opera, liberal education, basic scientific research, and various
forms of artistic expression." Merit goods have in common the fact
that many people regard them as undersupplied by the market and
worthy of a subsidy by the state or private donations. Merit goods,
however, are different from income redistribution. The usual purpose
of income redistribution is to increase equality and relieve poverty.
Donations to increase equality and relieve poverty are what moralists
usually mean by "charity."
17. For a list of the conditions, see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002).
18. Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study, in Public
Economy 13-15 (1959) (referring to "merit wants"). See generally John G. Head, On
Merit Goods, 1 Finanzarchiv N.F. 25 (1966).
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Some people will favor distinguishing donations for religion, merit
goods, and redistribution in the donation registration. They will want
the IRS to distinguish between non-profit organizations according to
which of these general purposes the organization serves. My hope is
that the donation registry will first be implemented in its simple form
and later people can debate about refinements.
In his magisterial book A Theory of Justice, Rawls advocated the
difference principle, according to which the basic institutions in a just
society maximize the material well-being of its worst-off members. 19
Our society, like every society, is unjust by this standard.
Constructing a just political order does not simply involve calls for
more and higher progressive taxation.
Other mechanisms are
required to circumvent the resistance of voters to high tax rates. I
have discussed some possibilities-the donation registry, the challenge
letter, and the volunteer registry.
A lot more intellectual work needs to be done on implementing
redistributive measures. The general aim is to find mechanisms that
increase the extent and efficiency of redistribution. The idea of
efficient redistribution is usually measured by the ratio of the amount
paid to recipients divided by the amount collected from contributors.
Thus a charity that distributes ninety cents of every dollar contributed
is more efficient than a charity that distributes eighty cents of every
dollar contributed. Economists are experts of two policy values:
efficiency and distribution. Consequently, economists are centrally
placed to develop mechanisms of efficient redistribution.
Charities are probably more efficient redistributors than the state
because donors monitor them. The fact that donors take an interest in
how their money is spent causes charities to be careful about spending
money. For this reason, the state is much more likely to waste money
and effort. Against this advantage of charity stands an advantage of
the state. Since charities collect donations, they have to spend a lot of
time and effort soliciting them. Since government agencies receive
taxes that are compulsory, they do not have to invest as much effort in
obtaining funds. Monitoring favors the relative efficiency of charities
and collection costs favor the relative efficiency of the state. When
balancing these considerations, my experience suggests that private
charities will be more efficient than state agencies, but I do not have
hard evidence to prove this assertion.
I have advocated creating a donation registry in order to reduce
inequality and poverty. Philosophers may wonder whether such a
mechanism pertains to political justice. The donation registry could
be regarded as a requirement of justice or as unconcerned with justice.
For example, justice presumably requires giving each person his due,

19. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 26, at 130-39 (rev. ed. 1999).
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whereas generosity concerns giving people more than their due.
Although generosity is admirable, justice does not require it.
In my opinion, the donation registry should be regarded as
implementing justice while providing scope for generosity. In Rawls's
view, political justice is a requirement of fairness. The purpose of the
donation registry is to ensure that people know what is fair with
respect to their redistributive effort, and social pressures are brought
to bear so people do their fair share. Doing your fair share is a
requirement of justice. Having done your fair share, you may wish to
be generous and still do more. So the donation registry implements
justice while providing scope for generosity.
An important fact to note about the donation registry is that it does
not rely on the state's coercive power to achieve fairness. Fairness
may justify the use of the state's coercive powers-as in a civil trialbut fairness does not necessarily require the use of state power. When
a superior means to coercion is available to achieve the ends of justice,
only a dogmatist would insist that coercion should be used. In my
opinion, the invention and development of less coercive means of
redistribution are essential to solving problems of distributive justice
in a modern economy.
If the donation registry is necessary to implement an ideal of
political justice such as the maximin or difference principle, then
failure to implement it is an injustice. The potential beneficiaries of
such a system could rightly complain about such an injustice. Once a
donation registry is implemented, everyone can complain about those
who do not do their fair share. However, these facts do not imply that
the beneficiaries of charitable redistribution have a right to what they
receive. Rather than having a right to what they receive, they have a
right to live in a just society.
By the cash register in Moe's Bookstore in Berkeley there is a pile
of books called Rules of Thumb. One of these rules of thumb is, "Up
to 20 percent of your dinner guests can be economists without ruining
the conversation."
Most of the speakers at this conference are
distinguished by their accomplishments, but I am distinguished by
being the only economist. When philosophers in the tradition of
Rawls choose a partner for a real conversation or hypothetical debate
in writing, they often select a utilitarian. I wish that philosophers in
law schools would notice that many of their colleagues are economists
and few identify themselves as utilitarians. If philosophers would
choose an economist instead of a utilitarian for dialogue, the
conversation would be equally unpleasant and more productive.
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